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Toscm v. CHRISTiAN [M C.M 
[8. F. No. 16978. In Bank. June 12, 1944.1 
MARIO TOSCHl, Appellant, v. L. L. CHRISTIAN et aI., 
Respondents. 
[1] Dismissal-Upon Failure of Proof-Appeal-Consideration of 
Evidence.-On appeal from a jUdgment of nonsuit, the evi-
dence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 
[2] Railroads-Injuries from Operation-Contributory Negligence 
-Duty to Stop, Look and Listen.-When a plaintiff, whose 
truck collided with a railroad engine, had an unimpeded 
view of the railroad tracks and of the approaching engine, 
the "stop, look and listen" rule could not be relied on to 
establish his contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
where the circumstances showed a six-track railroad yard 
crossing with two through or main tracks, switching opera-
tions progressing almost constantly, the employment of two 
flagmen by the railroad, whose duties involved traffic control 
on the highway and on the railroad, and a practical necessity 
for travelers on the highway to rely on the flagmen's signals. 
[3] Id.-Injuries from Operation-Contributory Negligence-Re-
liance on Nonoperation of Mechanical Device-Absence of 
Flagman.-The extent to which a traveler approaching a rail-
road crossing may rely on the failure of a mechanical device 
to operate, or on the absence of. a customary flagman, cannot 
be precisely defined as a pure proposition of law applicable 
to all the circumstances which usually complement such oc-
currences. 
[4] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact-Exercise of Care.-
An actor's conduct must always be gauged in relation to all 
the other material circumstances surrounding it, and if such 
other circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt as to whethel' 
the questioned conduct falls within or without the bounds of 
ordinary care, such doubt must be resolved as a matter of 
fact rather than of law. 
[2] Failure to stop, look and listen at railroad crossing as neg-
ligence per se, notes, 1 A.L.R. 203; 41 A.L.R. 405. See, also, 22 
Cal.Jur. 318; 44 Am.Jur. 795. 
[4] See 19 Cal.Jur. 729; 38 Am.Jur. 1041. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, § 81(2); [2] Railroads, 
§ 86(2); [3] RailroaJs, §§ 109(3), 109(5); [4] Negligence, § 150; 
[5] Raih'oads, § 109(1); [6] Railroads, § 121(6); [7] Railroads, 
§ 121(7). 
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[5] Railroads-Injuries from Operation-Contributory Negligence 
-Reliance on Erection of Safety Devices by Defendant.-A 
railroad company will not be permitted to encourage persona 
to relax their vigil concerning the dangers that lurk in rail-
road crossings by assuring them, through the erection of safe-
ty devices, that the danger has been removed or minimized, 
and, at the same time, to hold them to the same degree of care 
as would be required if those devices had not been provided. 
[6a.,6bl Id.-Actions-Questions of Law and Fact-Contributory 
Negligence.-In en action for injuries arising out of a colli-
sion of plaintiff's truck and a railroad engine at a busy metre:>-
politan crossing, it was a question of fact whether plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence, where he testified that 
he looked at the tracks before making a left-hand turn to 
cross them; where, prior to making such turn, he could not 
have seen the engine merely by looking to his left because 
the engine was behind him; where a concrete mixer behind 
the rear window of the cab of his truck was higher than the 
truck itself; where, after making the turn, he did not look 
to the left along the tracks; where he then noticed that one 
of the two customary flagmen was absent from sight and that 
the other had his stop signal under his arm, while holding a 
mirror with which he was playing by flashing sunlight on it; 
and where he testified that he was struck by the engine as 
he stopped the truck on being blinded by a mirror flash. 
17] Id.-Actions-Questions of Law and Fact-Negligence of Mo-
tor Vehicle Driver.-In an action for injuries arising out of a 
collision of plaintiff's truck and a railroad engine at a busy 
metropolitan crossing, assuming that plaintiff did "cut the 
corner" in making a left-hand turn to cross the tracks, whether 
this violation of Veh. Code, § 540 (b ), was a proximately 
contributing cause of the collision was a question of fact 
under the circumstances. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Franklin A. Griffin, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a 
colliSion of a motor truck and a railroad locomotive. Judg-
ment of nonsuit reversed. 
William E. Ferriter and James C. Purcell for Appellant. 
Dunne & Dunne and Arthur B. Dunne for Respondents. 
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SCHAUER, J.-This is an action to recover damages for 
personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a crossing colli-
sion between a truck driven by him and a locomotive of the 
defendant railroad company. Named as defendants are the 
Southern Pacific Company (hereinafter sometimes referred 
to as the railroad), the fireman and the engineer who oper-
ated the locomotive, and two flagmen who were stationed at 
the crossing, the latter four being employees of the railroad. 
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of nonsuit. So far as 
concerns disposition of this appeal the negligence of the de-
fendants is conceded and the sole question is whether the 
trial court was correct in its determination that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. We have 
concluded that in the state of the record the question of con-
tributory negligence was one of fact. 
There are substantial conflicts in the evidence as disclosed 
by the transcript and, as is not unusual in the enthusiasm of 
advocacy, still more in the contentions of counsel. [1] It is 
elementary, however, that on appeal from a judgment of non-
suit the evidence shall be viewed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff. (Gregg v. Western Pac. R. R. 00. (1924), 193 Cal. 
212, 216 [223 P. 553J.) Application of this rule strikes down 
at once, and without necessity for further comment thereon, 
all those portions of defendants' argument which depend on 
the resolution of conflicting inferences favorable to defen-· 
dants. Viewing the record obediently to the designated rule 
this opinion must predicate the following facts: 
This is not a rural crossing case. The ·locale of the acci-
dent is a congested mercantile and industrial district in the 
city of San Francisco in the area of a passenger and freight 
terminal where six substantially parallel tracks of defendant 
company cross Berry Street and where switching operations 
are almost constantly in progress. Berry Street runs gen-
erally east and west, and is intersected by Seventh Street 
running generally north and south. The most westerly of 
the six tracks curves from the northeast into Seventh Street 
and reaches the approximate center of that street (down 
which it then runs) at the intersection of Berry and Seventh. 
Immediately east of Seventh Street are the other five tracks 
crossing Berry. The most westerly track (in the center of 
Seventh Street) figures little in the controversy. The next 
two tracks are main line tracks and the remaining three 
(branching into a fourth just north of Berry Street) are yard 
June 1944] TOSCH! V. CHRISTIAN 
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tracks. There was a flagman's shelter at the northeast corner 
of the intersecting streets and another flagman's shelter on 
the south side of Berry Street just east of the sixth track. 
The collision occurred on the first (westerly) main line track; 
i. e., the first track east of the most westerly of the six tracks. 
The five tracks crossing Berry Street east of Seventh are 
closely spaced and may be spoken of as a group. Two flag-
men were normally present in this area, one on either side 
of this group of five tracks, and both were on duty on the 
day of the accident. All the tracks approach Berry Street 
(and Seventh) on an easy curve from the northeast and cross 
Berry at approximately right angles. Except for the flag-
man's shelter at the northeast corner of the two streets, there 
were no fixed obstructions to a view of the tracks by a person 
traveling south on Seventh Street (as was plaintiff here) in 
the block just north of the intersection. However, at the time 
of the accident several automobiles were parked along Seventh 
Street, between plaintiff's route (while he was on Seventh 
Street) and the tracks. A driver on Berry Street or one at-
tempting to turn onto Berry Street from Seventh Street can-
not ordinarily know whether any locomotives which may be 
moving in the yards in the course of switching operations 
will cross Berry Street or stop short of it. Recognizing this 
fact and in an effort to expedite traffic and secure safety, 
the railroad regularly stationed a flagman on each side of the 
group of five tracks, as previously mentioned, with the duty 
of going out into Berry and raising a stop sign as a warnin.g 
for highway vehicles when railroad traffic was to cross, and of 
flagging down railroad engines when necessary to permit high-
way traffic to be cleared from the tracks. Plaintiff was famil-
iar with the crossing; in his work asa truck driver he had 
driven over it at least twice and sometimes twenty times every 
working day for ten years. During all this time flagmen were 
stationed at the crossing and plaintiff was accustomed to rely 
upon their signals. In reliance upon them and pursuant to 
the long-established practice, when a flagman held up a stop 
sign plaintiff stopped; when a stop sign was not displayed or 
a flagman not in view plaintiff, apparently, had always pre-
viously found the crossing safe. 
On the morning of April 12, 1938, plaintiff approached 
the crossing driving south on Seventh Street and intending 
to turn left onto Berry Street. This was to have been his 
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fifth traverse of the crossing that morning. The day was 
clear. About 50 feet before he came to the intersection he 
looked to his left "On the tracks ... straight ahead and all 
around, " and saw no railroad traffic; at about the same time 
he decreased his speed from approximately 25 miles an hour 
to 10 miles an hour and shifted into a lower gear. He saw 
two automobiles approaching, one on Seventh Street from the 
south and one on Berry Street from the west; both cars 
stopped to let plaintiff make the left-hand turn onto and 
across the railroad tracks. He also looked for a flagman but 
there was none visible on the Seventh Street side of the tracks. 
(This flagman was not seen at all on this occasion by plaintiff 
but other witnesses establish that he emerged from his shelter 
after the accident.) Plaintiff turned onto Berry Street and 
drove safely across the fi~st or single track (which extends 
into and along the center of Seventh Street) and then saw 
one flagman (Darrough) on the far side of the group of five 
tracks which he was approaching. Plaintiff observed that 
such flagman was not standing in the middle of Berry Street, 
the usual position of the flagman when a locomotive was ap-
proaching, but was close to the north boundary line of the 
street; that he was not signaling traffic with either the stop 
sign, which was regularly used to signal highway vehicles, or 
the red flag, which was provided for signaling to railroad 
traffic, but was instead holding the sign and the flag under his 
arm; and that in his hands he held a mirror with which he 
was playing by flashing sunlight in it. After plaintiff turned, 
he did not look to the left along the tracks. As he drove onto 
the first track (referred to as the "Southbound Main Line") 
of the group of five tracks light from the mirror, with which 
the flagman was still playing, was flashed in his eyes, blinding 
him. He stopped and immediately his truck was struck by 
an engine which was backing in a southwesterly direction on 
the curved track and which had been approaching at an angle 
from behind him and to his left as he drove south down Sev-
enth Street. At no time had plaintiff seen the engine before 
it hit his truck and there is testimony from which it may be 
inferred that he could not have heard it: the neighborhood 
was 'noisy, the street was rough, and on the truck driven by 
plaintiff was a concrete mixer with drums which constantly 
revolved. For the purpose of this appeal we must take as 
true testimony that neither a whistle nor a bell on the engine 
sounded a warning. 
June 1944] TOSCHI 'IJ. CHRISTIAN 
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Defendants contend that from these facts it is evident that 
plaintiff did not exercise the slightest care for his own safety; 
that had he exercised any care the accident would not have 
happened. Plaintiff argues that the fact that he could have 
seen the engine had he looked with greater care "is a wholly 
false quantity in the case," that he was not only entitled but 
required, whether or not he saw a train approaching, to rely 
upon the long-established custom that the absence of a flag-
man was an assurance of safety since, so he asserts, a trav-
eler who would wait at this crossing until no engine was 
within sight or hearing could never cross. We are of the 
opinion that the correct view of the case lies between these 
two extremes. 
[2] Counsel for defendants assiduously argue the fact as 
to whether plaintiff's view of the tracks and of the approach-
ing engine was open or impeded, and contend that if it was 
open plaintiff's failure to look and see and stop in safety in-
exorably convicts him of contributory negligence. They rely 
upon Koch v. Sotdhern Cal. R. 00. (1906), 148 CaL 677 [84 
P. 176, 113 Am.St.Rep. 332, 7 Ann. Cas. 795, 4 L.R.A.N.S. 
521], and cases which have followed that decision. We think 
that in this argument counsel are viewing the evidence and 
selecting conflicting inferences favorable to their clients rather 
than to the plaintiff, but even if we assume their factual 
theory, as far as it goes, we find their proposition of law un-
tenable. The" stop, look and listen" rule, urged by defend-
ants, will not be applied to factual bases where its applica-
tion would be unreasonable. In the circumstances of this 
case, which comprise a six-track railroad yard crossing, 
switching operations progressing almost constantly, the em-
ployment of two flagmen by the railroad, whose duties involve 
traffic control on the highway and to some extent on the rail-
road, and a practical necessity for travelers on the highway to 
rely on the flagmen's signals because ordinarily it would be 
impossible for such travelers after they had observed railroad 
traffic approaching to know whether it would cross or stop 
short of the highway, the "stop, look and listen" rule is not 
wholly appropriate and cannot operate to establish contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law. Merely adding the fur-
ther circumstance that a traveler knew that two of the six 
tracks were main line tracks and that ordinarily trains on 
those tracks would constitute through traffic would not alter 
the legal proposition above l!tated. 
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[3] The extent to which a traveler may rely upon the 
failure of a mechanical device to operate, or upon the absence 
of a customary flagman, cannot be precisely defined as a pure 
proposition of law applicable to all the circumstances which 
usually complement such occurrences. [4] Standards of 
care are typically relative; rules of law are basically absolute. 
Hence, in regard to negligence, any attempt to screen factual 
conduct into legal classifications through a sieve of absolute 
law will be impracticable whenever the related circumstances 
admit of materially conflicting inferences. In other words, 
the actor's conduct must always be gauged in relation to all 
the other material circumstances surrounding it and if such 
other circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
such questioned conduct falls within or without the bounds 
of ordinary care then such doubt must be resolved as a matter 
of fact rather than of law. (Of. Peri v. Los Angeles Junction 
Ry. (1943), 22 Cal.2d 111, 120 [137 P.2d 441] ; Pokora v. 
Wabash R. 00. (1934), 292 U.S. 98, 105 [54 S.Ct. 580, 583, 
78 L.Ed. 1149, 1155, 91 A.L.R. 1049, 1054] ; Gregg v. Western 
Pac. R. R. 00. (1924), supra, 193 Cal. 212, 224 [223 P. 553] ; 
Zibbell v. Southern Pacific 0.0. (1911), 160 Cal. 237, 240 [116 
P. 513] ; Wessling v. Southern Pac. 00. (1931), 116 Cal.App. 
447, 450-451 [3 P.2d 22] ; Ogburn v. Atchison etc. Ry. 00. 
(1930), 110 Ca1.App. 587, 594 [294 P. 491].) 
[5] It is settled in this state that "A railroad company 
will not be permitted to encourage persons to relax their vigil 
concerning the dangers that lurk in railroad crossings by as-
suring them, through the erection of safety devices, that the 
danger has been removed or minimized, and, at the same time, 
to hold them to the same degree of care as would be required 
if those devices had not been provided. [Citations.] This 
does not mean that a person approaching a guarded crossing 
may blindly rely upon the absence of warning by a watch-
man, or the silence of an automatic signal, and proceed with-
out further regard for his own safety." (Will v. Southern 
Pacific 00. (1941), 18 Cal.2d 468, 474 [116 P.2d 44].) 
[6a] Here it does not appear that plaintiff exercised no 
care whatsoever; i. e., that he drove blindly ahead, heedless 
of his own safety. He testified that he looked at the tracks 
before he turned. He slowed the speed of his truck and 
shifted to a lower gear. His other testimony indicates that 
he was not oblivious of his surroundings and that he had in 
mind the relationship of Berry Street and the traffic thereon 
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to the railroad tracks and the traffic over them. While he 
was on Seventh Street, he could not have seen the engine 
merely by looking to his left because it was behind him. 
Whether he could have seen it even by looking backward over 
his shoulder is not clear. Behind the rear window of the cab 
of his truck was mounted a concrete mixer about 10 feet 
high, that is, higher than the cab itself. The near edge of 
the window in the left door of the cab was about 4 inches in 
front of plaintiff. Thus it may be that before he turned 
plaintiff could have seen the engine only by leaning forward, 
putting his head out the side window, and looking back. 
Whether no reasonable man exercising ordinary care, about 
to traverse a busy metropolitan crossing customarily guarded 
by two flagmen, having the knowledge of the locality which 
plaintiff possessed, driving the truck which plaintiff was op-
erating, and under the other circumstances shown here, would 
fail to adopt such mode of observation is a question of fact 
for a jury, not one of law for a court. In the Koch case 
(supra, 148 Cal. 677) the court declared (p. 680): "Of 
course, in any case such as this, where it is shown that a 
plaintiff has exercised some care, the question whether or not 
the care actually exercised was due and sufficient will al-
ways be a matter for determination by the jury." The ma-
jority of the court held that upon the facts in that case the 
plaintiff had failed to exercise any care whatsoever. Chief 
Justice Beatty, dissenting, differed from his associates, not 
fundamentally in the law but rather in his view and interpre-
tation of the evidence. The rule which we follow in our view 
of the evidence has already been stated. We entertain no 
doubt that the record before us, insofar as the doctrine of 
the Koch case is concerned, presents· a factual question re-
quiring submission to the jury. 
Pertinent in the surrounding circumstances of the instant 
case, it is to be noted that only after plaintiff turned, passing 
the momentary obstruction of the small flagman's shelter, 
did he have available a direct view of the tracks to his left. 
(Plaintiff completed his turn between 10 and 30 feet from 
the first main line track, depending upon whether he "cut 
the corner," as discussed infra.) His prior observation had 
disclosed no train or engine; his present observation disclosed 
nothing which he interpreted as a warning. He may well 
have regarded the presence of a flagman at the side of the 
street with his stop sign under his arm as a grcutt'r bdic:1tioa 
M2 rOSCH! v. CHRISTIAN [24 C.M 
of safety than the ab~ence of a flagman. In his belief that 
one flagman would not be absent from sight and the other 
engaged in childish play if danger was imminent, plaintiff 
may have been "deceived by appearances calculated to de-
ceive an ordinarily prudent man." (Sheets v. Southern Pa-
cific Co. (1931),212 OaL 509, 514 [299 P. 71].) We do not 
say that plaintiff's failure to look to his left as he turned onto 
the tracks and before he was blinded by the mirror flash is 
or is not excused; that is a question of fact. In the circum-
stances there appears no "standard oi conduct ... so obvious 
as to be applicable to all persoIls." (Chrissinger v. Southern 
Pacific Co. (1915), 169 Oal. 619, 624 [149 P. 175] ; see, also, 
Fernandes v. Sacramento City Railway Co. (1877),.52 Oal. 
45, 50.) 
[7] Defendants argue that plaintiff's own testimony shows 
he "cut the corner" in violation of section 540 (b) of the 
Vehicle Oode, which conduct was negligent per sej that had 
he turned properly he would have had a direct view of the 
tracks for several more feet before he came upon them. Al-
though plaintiff did testify that he "cut the corner" and 
although he so indicated his course on a diagram of the in-
tersection, he also testified that he was" coming right in the 
center, right over the manhole"; "I was coming right near 
to the manhole; I was going right over that." It appears 
from defendants' Exhibit 5 that the manhole was in the 
center of the intersection. This conflict in the testimony of 
plaintiff, like any other conflict in the evidence, in conformity 
with the above mentioned rule governing appeals from judg-
ments of nonsuit, must be resolved in favor of plaintiff's case. 
But assuming that plaintiff did "cut the corner," whether 
his violation of the Vehicle Oode section was a proximately 
contributing cause of the collision is, under the circumstances 
depicted, a question of fact. (See Sheets v. Southern Pac. Co. 
(1934), 1 Oa1.2d 408, 412-413 [35 P.2d 121]; Crawford v. 
S01dhern Pacific Co. (1935), 3 Oal.2d 427, 433 [45 P.2d 
183] .) 
Defendants point out that although there is general testi-
mony that the neighborhood was noisy, there is no evidence 
that any locomotive except the one which struck plaintiff 
was moving in the yards at the time of the collision or that 
there was any other noise which would have prevented plain-
ti:IT's hearing the sound of the locomotive's operation except 
that l:1ade by his own truck, which was within his controL 
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To silence the sound of the truck, however, it would have been 
necessary, not only that plaintiff stop to avoid the noise of 
travel over the rough cobblestone street, and turn off the 
truck motor, but also that he turn off the engine which kept 
the drums of the concrete mixer constantly revolving. If 
the drums of the mixer were not kept· revolving the ~oncrete 
would tend to dry and set and freeze the drums so that they 
could not be operated. It may be doubted whether these sug-
gested precautions would be taken by the ordinarily careful 
driver in the circumstances. 
[6b] Plaintiff argues that the flashing of the mirror. into 
his eyes caused him to bring his vehicle to a stop upon the 
track, which he might otherwise have cleared in safety. De~ 
fendants urge that the incident of the mirror could have had 
no causal connection with the accident since from plaintiff's 
own testimony it appears that the light shone only at the 
very instant of collision, after he had negligently driven onto 
the track. Plaintiff testified, "As I stopped, that second I 
was hit by a train .... " Weare not satisfied that his testi-
mony of immediacy of the collision after stopping of the 
truck completely precludes the possibility that the mirror 
flash which blinded him and caused him to stop on the track 
may have caused him to stop just in time to be struck by 
the engine. There would necessarily be some appreciable 
interval of time between the flashing of the mirror and the 
translation of such stimulus into stoppage of the truck. That 
defendants' interpretation of the incident may appear more 
probable than plaintiff's is a consideration not within the 
province of a reviewing court. Certainly the incident is not 
one so within the range of common experience that its solu-
tion is obvious. 
Defendants further contend that there is no evidence iden-
tifying the man supposed to have flashed the mirror as the 
flagman Darrough. Plaintiff testified, "I saw this fellow over 
here (indicating), with that signal under his arm, playing 
with a mirror, and it shone right in my eyes, and I stopped"; 
also, "I ... saw this other flagman on the other side that was 
playing with the mirror. He had his stop sign under his arm, 
with his little flag ... " Furthermore Darrough was in court 
and apparently was the person indicated by plaintiff. Dar-
rough himself testified that he was the flagman on the far 
side of the tracks at the time of the accident. While he de-
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nied that he was playing with a mirror it is obvious that the 
evidence amply supports a contrary conclusion. 
As stated above, plaintiff contends that, even had he seen 
the approaching engine, he could have assumed, in the ab-
sence of a signal and in the light of the other circumstances 
shown, that it was safe to cross. Defendants call attention to 
plaintiff's testimony that he knew the first two tracks (of the 
group of five) were main line tracks, and argue that he must 
have. known that no switching operations take place on the 
main line tracks, that had he seen the engine he would have 
known from the fact that it was proceeding on a main line 
track that it was not a switch engine but a road engine on its 
way to the roundhouse south of Berry Street and hence would 
not stop short of the crossing. Since plaintiff admittedly did 
not see the engine, it is not necessary to discuss these con-
flicting contentions as to what would have been reasonable 
conduct on plaintiff's part had he seen it, identified the track 
it was on, and drawn the deductions suggested. Inasmuch as 
it is a question of fact as to whether plaintiff was contribu-
tively negligent in failing to see or hear the engine at all, the 
case must go to the jury on that theory and for determination 
of that fact. 
The judgment of nonsuit is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., . Curtis, J., 
Oarter, J., concurred. Edmonds, J., and 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. I cannot sub-
scribe, however, to the view that when a jury determines 
standards of care in negligence cases it is simply finding 
facts. It is a question of law what the rule or standard of 
conduct should be for adjudging the actions of men as law-
ful or unlawful and for determining the consequences of 
those actions. A question of fact relates to what acts or 
events have occurred or what conditions exist or have existed. 
(See Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at The Com-
mon Law, 183-262.) Questions of fact in this country, where 
there is a con.stitutional right to a jury trial, arc for the jury, 
while questions of law are ordinarily for the judge. In the 
field of negligence it is common practice for the jury to deter-
mine not only the facts but the standard of conduct to be 
applied within the compass of the rule that the conduct pre-
scribed must be that of a reasonably prudent man under the 
~ .. -. -.----~.--~--~--~-~.-.------------------
\ 
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circumstances. To determine whether givcn conduct should 
impose liability or bar a recovery is to make law. If the 
court has formulated a standard of reasonable conduct that 
is applicable to the case, the jury's sole concern is to deter-
mine whether a person's conduct has met that standard, a 
question of fact. If the court has not formulated such a 
standard, it becomes the jury's responsibility to do so, and 
thereafter to determine 'whether a person's conduct has met 
that standard. The decision as to whether the standard 
should be fixed by the court or left to the jury rests with 
the appellate courts and turns upon whether the jury would 
be at an advantage in arriving at a standard by virtue of 
being a cross-section of the community and therefore repre-
sentative of the community views and attitudes. (See Clink-
scales v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72 [136 P.2d 777] ; Sioux City & 
Pacific R. R. CO. v. Stoid, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 657, 664 [21 
L.Ed. 745] ; Grand l'nmk Railway Co. v. lves, 144 U.S. 408, 
417 [12 S.Ot. 679, 36 L.Ed. 485] ; Restatement: Torts, § 285 ; 
Holmes, The Common Law, 120-129; Holmes, Law in Science 
and Science in Law, 12 Harv.L.Rev. 443, 457.) 
[Sac. No. 5587. In Bank. June 16, 1944.] 
DORA B. TRASK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH A. 
MOORE et al., Appellants ; EDWARD EALEY, Oross-
Defendant and Respondent. 
[la,lb] Trust Deeds - Property Embraced - Water System.-A 
water distributing system, although lying without the limits 
of land described in a deed of trust, passed to the purchaser 
at a trustee's sale as an appurtenance of said land, where the 
pipes were attached to and were an incident to the main ma-
chinery-the pumps and wells-on the trustor's land, where 
the pipe extension was necessary to the enjoyment of the prin-
cipal thing and indispensable in the supply. of. water to the 
neighboring homes, and where the parties to the trust deed 
intended the appurtenances to the land to be encumbered un-
der the terms of that instrument. 
[2] Deeds-Property Conveyed-Incidents and Appnrtenances.-
As a general rule, a conveyance of property carries with it 
[2] See 9 Cal.Jur. 286; 16 Am.Jur. 602. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trust Deeds, § 10; [2] Deeds, § 137; 
[3J Waters, § 612; [4J Appeal and Error, § 30. 
